41st Alabama Infantry Regiment

The 41st Alabama Infantry Regiment was organized on 16 May 1862 with men from Blount, Fayette, Greene, Perry, Pickens, Tuscaloosa, and Washington counties. After proceeding to Chattanooga, it operated in middle Tennessee for some months and then joined the Army of Tennessee soon after its return from the Kentucky campaign. It was initiated into the harsh realities of war when "stormed at with shot and shell," as part of Hanson's Brigade at Murfreesboro. During that episode, it lost its brigadier and 198 casualties. The regiment then remained at Tullahoma until ordered to Mississippi with the other portions of Breckinridge's Division. It was engaged in the operations for the relief of Vicksburg and was in the trenches at Jackson. Having rejoined the Army of Tennessee, the 41st was in the forward movement at Chickamauga and in the struggle over the enemy's fortified position. Again, the brigadier was lost as were 189 casualties from the regiment. It was shortly after transferred to the brigade of Gen'l Archibald Gracie. As part of Longstreet's corps, the 41st participated in the struggles and privations of the winter campaign in East Tennessee, sustaining heavy losses. The regiment reached Virginia in April 1864 and was engaged in the Battle of Drewry's and Dutch Gap.

Drewry's Bluff
Built in May 1862, this was the first defensive position constructed on the James River during the Civil War to defend against the Union Navy. It later became the Annapolis of the South, training Confederate Navy midshipmen. The Confederate Marine Corps trained here as well.

Dutch Gap Canal
Dug under the direction of Union Gen. Benjamin Butler, this canal was meant to bypass Confederate defenses along the James River. In the 1870s, Butler, then a senator, saw to the completion of this canal, the main river access to Richmond today.

The Battle of Murfreesboro (Stones River) 31 Dec. 62 and 2 Jan. 1863
Hanson's Brigade at Murfreesboro.


According to a staff officer,  Bragg "often related anecdotes of Buell, Thomas, and Sherman. Thomas had been in his old battery, and he never could praise him too much."

On 14 April 1865 Grant told Lincoln that Rosecrans and Thomas' battle at Stones River "was no victory, - that a few such fights would have ruined us." This display of  jealousy and hyprocrisy from the butcher of Cold Harbor is still hard to stomach, even 150 years later.

After Gen. Braxton Bragg’s defeat at Perryville, Ky. on 8 Oct. 62, he retreated and reorganized his Army of the Mississippi, renaming it the Army of Tennessee. They then advanced to Murfreesboro, Tenn., and prepared to go into winter quarters.  William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland followed Bragg from Kentucky and occupied Nashville. Rosecrans left Nashville on 26 Dec. 62 with about 44,000 men. He found Bragg’s army of about 37,000 men on 29 Dec. 62 and went into camp. That evening the battle started with a contest between the respective military bands. It is reported that at the end of the concert both armies, together, sang Home Sweet Home: "Mid pleasures and palaces though we may roam, be it ever so humble, there's no place like home. A charm from the skies seems to hallow us there, which, seek through the world, is not met with elsewhere. Home, home, sweet, sweet home, there's no place like home, there's no place like home." It's a nice story, anyway.

At dawn on the 31st, before Rosecrans's attack against Bragg’s right got started, Bragg, although outnumbered, attacked with the bulk of his forces the Union right flank under Alexander McCook. Rosecrans had allowed his attacking wing under Crittenden to eat breakfast first, and then these troops had to cross the river in order to get into action. Both of these factors allowed Bragg to get the jump on Rosecrans. Another factor was the negligence of McCook whom Rosecrans had put in charge of his right wing, despite McCook's mixed performance at Perryville. Thomas had warned Rosecrans to expect an attack against McCook's wing, but McCook was not prepared.  As Henry M. Cist wrote ("The Army of the Cumberland," 1882, chapt. 8):

"Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army, was absent from his command at division headquarters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the division were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this was criminal negligence--a failure in the performance of duty--for which some one should have suffered.  To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day."

McCook was in charge of that portion of the Union line and was responsible for its dispositions. Rosecrans had put him in that position, and for Rosecrans to hold him to account would have required that he hold himself to account. This is not to fault the personal courage of both McCook and Rosecrans who stayed at the front and attempted to manage their forces while men to the left and right of them were killed, but the reponsibility of a commander encompasses more than standing fast under fire.

Furthermore, Rosecrans' place was in the middle of his line, but he had so little confidence in Crittenden to carry out the planned attack that he felt compelled to be there in person. In exculpation it should be mentioned that this was Rosecran's first experience in battle as independent army commander, and few people are born with the ability to manage such large masses of men.

The disaster Cist referred to unfolded as Johnson's division was first attacked and then scattered west and north. Then Davis' division fell apart. While this was happening, Rosecrans was on the other end of his line, supervising the preparations for his own attack. In a repeat of his behavior at Perryville, McCook compounded his error by not keeping his commander properly informed of his situation:

"Within an hour after the opening of the battle, one of McCook's staff officers reported to Rosecrans that the Right Wing was heavily pressed and needed assistance.  Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson's division, nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis, made necessary thereby" (Cist, chapt. 8).

McCook, in full knowledge of his failure, but not quite willing to admit it, sent off the staff officer with a message which was so muted as to be deceptive. Rosecrans, in his ignorance of the true situation on his other wing, therefore continued for a while in his project. By 10:00 AM the Confederates were in control of the field on Rosecrans' right, but had been slowed by the resistance of Sheridan's, Negley's, and Rousseau's divisions. Sheridan was the first to substantially check the Confederate onslaught, but then he reported to Thomas that he was out of ammunition and simply pulled his division out of the line and ended up on the far right of the Union line and out of the fight. As he withdrew, he passed by Palmer's and through Rousseau's divisions which were still fighting. At about this time Rosecrans met him and gave him the following order:

"Replenish your ammunition and get your men back into the fight. Hazen has his hands full at the end of the Round Forest. Support him" (Lamers, The Edge of Glory - A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans, 1961, pg. 227; J.L. Gilmore, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, 1898, pg. 130).

If indeed Sheridan received this instruction from Rosecrans, he did not obey it.

Thomas had held Rousseau in reserve and placed him where he could move to support one wing or the other, almost as though Thomas foresaw what was about to happen. Other measures which Thomas took also demonstrated a sort of prescience. Shortly before the battle he had created a provost guard out of one of his best divisions under Parkhurst which was to retrieve many a straggler and save much of the wagon train (with the ammunition) the morning of the 31st. Thomas also had his engineers cut roads through the cedar trees the day before the battle, so that the movement of troops and equipment between wings was facilitated. On the 31st this was to prove crucial to Thomas who directed the withdrawal of the right and reformed the Federal line along the Nashville Pike. Also at Murfreesboro Thomas stood like, well, a rock. Bragg indirectly confirmed this in his report when he wrote:

<ar29_665>
"Numbering at least two to our one, he [Rosecrans] was enabled to bring fresh troops at every point to resist our progress, and he did so with a skill and judgment which has ever characterized his aide commander [Thomas]."

By 11:00 A.M. the Confederates had driven the Union line almost back to the Nashville Pike, where Rousseau's, Negley's, and Palmer's divisions had formed a new hooked-shaped formation supported by the artillery, which Thomas had placed providentially at the center, now the angle of the line. This sector was located at the Round Forest, a clump of scrubby cedars. It wasn't very big or very high, but it provided cover. It was defended by a relatively unsung brigade commander named William B. Hazen. Polk attacked his position all day long, and couldn't budge him. Hazen, by the way, also had problems with ammunition, but his position was critical to the survival of the army. After most of Crittenden's corps was shifted to the right, Hazen was now the extreme left of the Union line. He knew that, if he fell back, the battle was over, as the following quote from his report demonstrates:
<ar29_544>
"Upon this point, as a pivot, the entire army oscillated from front to rear the entire day. The ammunition of the Forty-first Ohio Volunteers was by this time nearly exhausted, and my efforts to replenish were up to this time fruitless. I dispatched word to the rear that assistance must be given, or we must be sacrificed, as the position I held could not be given up, and gave orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Wiley to fix his bayonets and to Colonel Casey (without bayonets) to club his guns and hold the ground at all hazards, as it was the key of the whole left."

Hazen wasn't as good at self-promotion as Sheridan was, but he ran his command in Thomas' style and always got the job done. Another unsung hero of the day was Horatio P. Van Cleve. He was withdrawn from the left and thrown against Confederates who had penetrated far to the rear of the Union position. Van Cleve was wounded early but continued to lead his division until that evening, and his division suffered the highest losses (27 %) of Rosecrans' entire army.

Since Jefferson Davis had, shortly before the battle, sent one of Bragg's divisions to Vicksburg, Bragg had no reserves with which to clinch the battle.  He ordered Breckinridge to reinforce Polk, but Breckinridge only sent part of the troops requested, citing a large Union force which was approaching him from the north. However, there was no such force. He may have fabricated the intelligence as a form of protest against the recent execution of a popular soldier from his home state (Kentucky) who had been caught deserting a second time. Finally, the Confederate attack ran out of steam, especially after Union reinforcements arrived which Rosecrans had retrieved from his left and, in the thick of the firing, personally placed in the new line. Also, some of McCook's units were reconstituted and went back into the battle that afternoon. By the end of the day, Rosecrans' numerical superiority had made itself felt.

On New Year's Day both armies skirmished listlessly and rested. In wires back to Richmond Bragg declared victory, hoping that Rosecrans would confirm this by withdrawing. Rosecrans was considering it. In a late night conference he queried his generals. Thomas said according to one report: "This army can't retreat", and according to another report: "Gentlemen, I know of no better place to die than right here." Mabye he said both things, or something else entirely. Whatever he said, he was for staying, and he enjoyed such respect in the Army of the Cumberland, that his counsel was heeded. The next day, when Bragg saw that Rosecrans hadn't blinked, he decided to roll the dice once more. In the afternoon of 2 Jan. 63, Bragg sent Breckinridge with a division against a Union division which had crossed Stones River the day before and taken up a strong position east of the river. The Confederates pushed most of the Federals back across McFadden’s Ford, but then, with the assistance of the massed Union artillery under Mendenhall, the Federals repulsed the attack and retook the ground, inflicting so many casualties that Breckinridge's charge could be ranked right up there with Lee's at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg and Hood's at Franlkin.

On 3 Jan. 63 Bragg received intelligence which informed him that Rosecrans's army was larger than previously thought, and Polk and Hardee counseled retreat. On 4 Jan. Bragg left Murfreesboro in order to set up a new line to the south based on Shelbyville and Tullahoma, Tenn. Rosecrans stayed in Murfreesboro without pursuing. He remained there 6 months while he refitted his shattered army and prepared his masterpiece Tullahoma. Since Bragg had withdrawn, the battle is considered to be a Union victory. Both sides had heavy losses. Estimated casualties: 23,515 total (US 13,249; CS 10,266)

* According to Ambrose Bierce, topographical engineer under Thomas, Hazen was "the best hated man that I ever saw, and his very memory is a terror for every unworthy soul in the service. His was a stormy life: he was in trouble all around. Grant, Sherman, Sheridan and a countless multitude of the less eminent luckless had the misfortune, at one time or another, to incur his disfavor, and he tried to punish them all...He was aggressive, arrogant, tyrannical, honorable, truthful, courageous - a skillful soldier, a faithful friend and one of the most exasperating of men."
It was then in the protracted siege at Petersburg north of the James River, and in the battles around that city. The regiment was engaged at Hatcher's Run and in the fighting on the Appomattox retreat under Gen'l Gordon. About 270 men were present under Col. Martin L. Stansel for the surrender [Joseph Crute, Units of the Confederate States Army, p. 27,reports 14 officers and 84 men]. Of the original 1454 names on the rolls, about 130 were killed, about 370 died of disease, and 135 were transferred or discharged.

Field and staff officers:
Cols. Henry Tailbird (Perry; resigned);
Martin Luther Stansel (Pickens; wounded, Murfreesboro);
Lt. Cols. James Thomas Murfee (Tuscaloosa; resigned);
Martin Luther Stansel (promoted)
Porter King;
Thomas Gaillard Trimmier (Tuscaloosa; KIA, White Oaks Road);
Majors Martin Luther Stansel (promoted);
Thomas Gaillard Trimmier (promoted);
Jesse Gent Nash (Pickens; resigned);
Lemuel Tillman Hudgins (Tuscaloosa; KIA, Petersburg);
John Miller Jeffries (Pickens); and
Adjutant John D. Leland.

Captains, and counties from which the companies came:

    Co. "A" (Tuscaloosa County): Thomas Gaillard Trimmier (promoted); James M. Mills (resigned, 24 Dec 62); Humphrey H. Sartain
    Co. "B" (Pickens County): John C. Kirkland (resigned, 2 April 63); L. F. Shelton
    Co. "C" (Pickens County): Jesse G. Nash (promoted); Jere H. Cason (wounded, Bean's Station; resigned, 9 Feb 64); John C. Moorhead
    Co. "D" (Pickens County): Robert A. McCord (died in service, 17 June 62); Bela A. Hudgins (wounded, Murfreesboro; retired, 17 Nov 64); John C. Fair
    Co. "E" (Perry and Greene Counties): William G. England (resigned, 3 Oct 62); Francis M. Moore (resigned, 10 Nov 63); Andrew B. S. Moseley
    Co. "F" (Tuscaloosa County): Benjamin F. Eddins (resigned, 1 Dec 63); Luther Morgan Clements (wounded, Chickamauga)
    Co. "G" (Tuscaloosa County): Lemuel T. Hudgins (promoted); James White
    Co. "H" (Fayette County): Franklin Ogden (resigned, 24 March 64); Holland M. Bell (wounded, Hatcher's Run)
    Co. "I" (Pickens County): Thomas Smith Abernethy (resigned, 16 Dec 62); John M. Jeffries (promoted); John T. Harkins
    Co. "K" (Pickens County): James N. Craddock (resigned, 24 Oct 64); James Halbert